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INTRODUCTION
Over fifty years ago, in the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of
Education,' the United States Supreme Court ruled that racially segre-
gated public schools are "inherently unequal."'2 For rejecting the "sepa-
rate but equal" logic of Plessy v. Ferguson,3 Brown is considered "a
great moral victory ' 4 and is warmly remembered as "'the single most
honored opinion in the Supreme Court's corpus."' 5 For its part, Plessy,
which upheld the segregation of public school students on the basis of
race, is said to "represent[ ] the worst understanding of race that America
has to offer."'6
In recent years, the Supreme Court has addressed the extent to
which race may be used in other aspects of public education, most nota-
bly race-based affirmative action policies, which generally provide appli-
cants from underrepresented minority groups with preferences in
1 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 485 (1954).
2 Id. at 495.
3 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896).
4 Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 HARv.
L. REV. 973, 973 (2005).
5 Id. at 974 (quoting Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education: A Critical Introduc-
tion, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S Top
LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 3, 4 (Jack M. Balkin
ed., 2001)).
6 Ronald S. Sullivan Jr., Multiple Ironies: Brown at 50, 47 How. L.J. 29, 31 (2003).
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admissions in order to secure the benefits of a sufficiently racially di-
verse school.7 Members of the Court have expressed their discomfort
with affirmative action. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, for example,
stated, "Preferment by race, when resorted to by the State, can be the
most divisive of all policies, containing within it the potential to destroy
confidence in the Constitution and in the idea of equality."' 8 Even when
approving of a race-conscious affirmative action policy in 2003, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor warned that such plans "are potentially so danger-
ous" that they must be limited in duration.9 Clearly, segregation of stu-
dents and affirmative action remains controversial and sensitive when
considered through the lens of race.
This Article examines segregation and affirmative action in a differ-
ent context-that of gender. Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 ("Title IX") l° prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender in
education programs or activities that receive federal financial assis-
tance. 11 The regulations implementing Title IX, however, explicitly per-
mit recipients of federal funding to offer single-sex schools, classes, and
extracurricular activities. 12 The regulations also permit recipients to
"take affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions which re-
sulted in limited participation therein by persons of a particular sex."' 13
This Article discusses whether and to what extent the affirmative
action provision of Title IX permits recipients of federal financial assis-
tance to offer single-sex educational programs. It addresses primarily
two questions: If, as the Court declared in Brown, "in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place," 14 is it none-
theless permissible under Title IX to segregate students on the basis of
gender for affirmative action purposes? 15 If so, what requirements may
guide institutions, legal practitioners, and the courts in determining
7 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
8 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 2594, 2663 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concur-
ring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("It is a sordid business, this divvying us
up by race.").
9 Gruter, 539 U.S. at 342.
1o 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
11 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (2007).
12 Id. § 106.34(b)-(c).
13 Id. § 106.3(b).
14 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
15 See Frances Elizabeth Burgin, Note, Fire Where There Is No Flame: The Constitution-
ality of Single-Sex Classrooms in the Commonwealth, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 821,
825 (2007) (stating that it is unclear "whether the principle of 'separate as inherently unequal'
would also implicate gender-segregated classrooms"). But see Laura Fortney, Comment, Pub-
lic Single-Sex Elementary Schools: "Separate But Equal" in Gender Fifty Years After Brown
v. Board of Education, 35 U. TOL. L. REv. 857 (2004) (arguing that single-sex education
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whether such single-sex programs are established in a manner consistent
with existing law?
Part I argues that single-sex education as affirmative action is per-
mitted under Title IX, based on an analysis of the text and purpose of
Title IX and its implementing regulations,' 6 relevant Supreme Court ju-
risprudence, government statements, and other sources. This Article
reaches a result that may seem surprising or contradictory to some: that
segregated education, while constitutionally prohibited and socially re-
volting when based on race, is permissible when based on gender. Part II
enumerates several conditions that should help single-sex affirmative ac-
tion educational programs survive a legal challenge. 17 The final section
is a conclusion.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that this Article does
not purport to assess the merits of implementing single-sex education to
compensate for discrimination or to achieve any other pedagogical objec-
tive. 18 Moreover, this Article will not speculate as to why "single-sex
education [is not] as troublesome [to legal scholars or society at large] as
single-race education,"' 19 or about why gender-based classifications are
established on the basis of gender is inconsistent with Brown and a broader principle of
equality).
16 These are contrasting interpretive tools emphasized by Justices Antonin Scalia and
Stephen Breyer, respectively. Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 22
(1997) (stating that "[tihe text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed"), with
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85
(2005) (arguing, with respect to interpretive aids, that judges should place greater emphasis on
"statutory purpose and congressional intent").
17 Courts have listed factors under which race-conscious affirmative action admissions
policies should be evaluated. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2005)
(enumerating "a four-part narrow tailoring inquiry" that the Supreme Court used in the context
of race-based affirmative action); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
426 F.3d 1162, 1180 (9th Cir. 2005) (identifying the Supreme Court's "five hallmarks of a
narrowly tailored affirmative action plan"), rev'd on other grounds, 127 S. Ct. 2378 (2007).
Some scholars have attempted to decipher factors applicable to gender-based affirmative ac-
tion; however, the articles present factors that are either stale or erroneously grounded. See
infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
18 The benefits of single-sex education have been discussed in other circles. See, e.g.,
Separate Class Needed for Boys, BBC NEWS, May 29, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/uknews/england/cambridgeshire/4591653.stm; Peg Tyre, Boy Brains, Girl Brains:
Are Separate Classrooms the Best Way to Teach Kids?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 59,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/104472; see also Pherabe Kolb, Reaching for the
Silver Lining: Constructing a Nonremedial Yet "Exceedingly Persuasive" Rationale for Sin-
gle-Sex Educational Programs in Public Schools, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 367, 369 (2001) (arguing
that "empirical research, bolstered by both statistical data and in-depth case studies, must un-
dergird any assertion that gender-specific programs and policies are beneficial for some stu-
dents"). For purposes of this Article, it is presumed that the benefits of single-sex education
have been sufficiently well-established that, absent legal restraints, school boards would have
the discretion to conclude that same-sex offerings would benefit certain students.
19 Jack Balkin, Is There a Slippery Slope from Single-Sex Education to Single-Race Edu-
cation?, 37 J. OF BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. 126, 126-27 (2002), available at http://www.
yale.edulawweb/jbalkin/opeds/singlesexeducationl .htm (contending that that certain "histori-
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not as prominent a part of the American culture war as issues involving
race, especially race-conscious affirmative action.
To date, legal scholars have paid scant attention to the threshold
question of whether, and if so, when, a single-sex affirmative action pro-
gram under Title IX is compatible with the Constitution. Indeed, no fed-
eral court has squarely addressed what circumstances render a sex-
segregated educational program permissible,20 nor has the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education's ("DOE's") Office for Civil Rights ("OCR"), the
government authority responsible for enforcing Title IX, issued formal
policy on the subject. 2' Little discussion exists on this topic in academic
literature, 22 and the few articles on point either do not reflect recent de-
cal facts tend to suggest why single-sex education carries very different freight than single-
race education"); see also Bennett L. Saferstein, Note, Revisiting Plessy at the Virginia Mili-
tary Institute: Reconciling Single-Sex Education with Equal Protection, 54 U. PiTT. L. REv.
637, 646-47 (1993) (advancing thoughts as to why "[s]ex discrimination does have some
significant differences from racial discrimination, particularly in the context of education").
20 In fact, only two published federal court opinions cite to 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b). See
Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1518 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (discussing
whether 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) "require[s] preemption of a state law that prohibits affirmative
action"), vacated, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997); Garrett v. Bd. of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004,
1009 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (deferring to an opinion of the U.S. Department of Education, Office
for Civil Rights, that "all male public elementary and secondary school programs violate Title
IX").
21 As will be noted in Part I, an oft-quoted OCR resolution letter on sex-segregated
opportunities is not a formal statement of OCR policy. See also Single-Sex Classes and
Schools: Guidelines on Title IX Requirements, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,102, 31,102-03 (May 8, 2002)
(informing local educational agencies, or LEAs, that they "may offer a single single-sex school
if such an action constitutes remedial or affirmative action," but failing to provide any further
guidance, suggesting only, and obviously, that the LEAs "should be aware of constitutional
requirements in this area," as "LEAs may be challenged in court litigation on constitutional
grounds").
22 See Grace-Marie Mowery, Creating Equal Opportunity for Female Coaches: Affirma-
tive Action Under Title IX, 66 U. CiN. L. REv. 283, 296-97 (1997) (discussing affirmative
action under Title IX in the context of employment); Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Separate But Equal
Education in the Context of Gender, 49 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 785, 789 (2005) ("Brown is never
cited by the Supreme Court in discussion of these issues, nor has 'separate but equal' ever
been held constitutionally impermissible in the context of sex."); Rosemary Salomone, Rich
Kids, Poor Kids, and the Single-Sex Education Debate, 34 AKRON L. REv. 209, 221 (2000)
(noting only that "the question [exists] as to whether single-sex classes can be initiated only
for remedial purposes" and that "the regulations, adopted in the mid-1970s to specifically
address discrimination against girls, remain unclear on" whether single-sex classes can be
established for boys, particularly "non-minority boys"); Galen Sherwin, Single-Sex Schools
and the Antisegregation Principle, 30 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 35, 53 n.112 (2005)
("[A] consideration of how Title IX's affirmative action exception might apply to single-sex
colleges or professional schools is beyond [the Article's] scope.") (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.3).
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velopments in the law23 or are inaccurate in critical respects. 24 Moreo-
ver, the topic rests on an uncertain and unclear legal landscape. 25
That gender discrimination persists in American society, including
in academia 26 and in the workplace, 27 is beyond dispute. As a conse-
quence, the need for remedies persists, including remedies that may be
implemented through the educational system. Educational administrators
urgently need guidance on how they may legally implement compensa-
tory educational opportunities for the disadvantaged gender. 28 Reliable
guidelines should assist the educational and legal communities in distin-
guishing legally sound single-sex affirmative action programs from those
that lose their character as constitutionally protected educational
initiatives.
23 E.g., Fred Von Lohmann, Note, Single-Sex Courses, Title IX, and Equal Protection:
The Case for Self-Defense for Women, 48 STAN. L. REV. 177, 183-87 (1995) (addressing
"Affirmative Remedial Action Under Title IX Regulations" without the benefit of significant
judicial and administrative developments from the intervening years, including, but not limited
to, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-533 (1996), and OCR's release of regulatory
amendments permitting single-sex education).
24 For example, Maryam Ahranjani and Monica J. Stamm suggest that three conditions
must be met for a single-sex school established under 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) to be permissible.
Maryam Ahranjani, Mary Daly v. Boston College: The Impermissibility of Single-Sex Class-
rooms within a Private University, 9 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 179, 197 (2001);
Monica J. Stamm, Note, A Skeleton in the Closet: Single-Sex Schools for Pregnant Girls, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1217 n.93 (1998). In formulating these conditions, however, Ahranjani
and Stamm rely on information with no precedential value. Ahranjani, supra note 24, at 197;
Stamm, supra note 24, at 1217 n.93. The conditions themselves, thus, do not reliably elucidate
the requirements that a recipient should satisfy to properly implement sex-segregated educa-
tion under 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b).
25 See Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term Con-
sequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 455 (1999).
26 See MARTHA S. WEST & JOHN W. CURTIS, AAUP FACULTY GENDER EQUITY INDICA-
TORS 2006 4 (2006), available at http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/63396944-44BE-4ABA-
9815-5792D93856F1/0/AAUPGenderEquitylndicators2006.pdf ("Women hold only 24 per-
cent of full professor positions in the U.S., despite the overwhelming presence of women
students on campus for the past twenty-five years. Women are obtaining doctoral degrees at
record rates, but their representation in the ranks of tenured faculty remains below expecta-
tions, particularly at research universities.").
27 See Want to Return to Your Career?, MSNBC, May 18, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.
com/id/18726931 ("It's been over 20 years since the Wall Street Journal first coined the phrase
"glass ceiling" and yet today only 12 of all Fortune 500 companies are run by a female CEO
and the average woman still makes 80 cents for every dollar a man makes.").
28 See Kay Bailey Hutchison, The Lesson of Single-Sex Public Education: Both Success-
ful and Constitutional, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (2001) (arguing that, due to the lack of
clarity on the legality of single-sex education programs, "[sichool officials had been unwilling
to risk being subjected to a discrimination complaint or enforcement action, which could in-
clude the complete loss of all federal funds").
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I. SINGLE-SEX AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EDUCATIONAL
PROGRAMS ARE GENERALLY PERMISSIBLE UNDER
TITLE IX AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
A. TITLE IX GENERALLY PERMITS INSTITUTIONS TO OFFER SINGLE-
SEX AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS
1. Text of Title IX and Its Implementing Regulations
The Title IX statute generally prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex in all educational programs or activities receiving federal financial
assistance.29 A version of Title IX that passed in the House of Repre-
sentatives "would have required that all single-sex schools, primary and
secondary, public and private, become coeducational. ' 30 But Title IX, as
enacted, only required some institutions to be coeducational. In particu-
lar, Title IX's prohibition against discrimination in admission applies
only to "institutions of vocational education, professional education, and
graduate higher education, and to public institutions of undergraduate
higher education." 31 As a result, schools in these specific sectors of edu-
cation may not restrict enrollment to a single sex for any other purpose,
even for affirmative action. 32 Put another way, "[g]raduate, vocational,
and professional education," as well as public undergraduate education,
"seem to be clearly identified by law as requiring coeducational admis-
sions policies."'33 The statute itself establishes a significant limitation on
the universe of single-sex education a recipient may provide. 34
Conversely, the statute's prohibition in admissions does not apply to
non-vocational elementary and secondary institutions or to private under-
graduate institutions.35 As a result, "private single-sex colleges would
29 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
30 Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 883 (3rd Cir. 1976), affid by
an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (per curiam).
31 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1).
32 See Jones ex rel. Michele v. Bd. of Educ., 632 F. Supp. 1319, 1320 (E.D.N.Y. 1986);
Kimberly J. Jenkins, Constitutional Lessons for the Next Generation of Public Single-Sex Ele-
mentary and Secondary Schools, 47 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1953, 2025 n.379 (2006) (observ-
ing that 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) "prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of sex in admissions to
vocational education programs.").
33 Amy H. Nemko, Single-Sex Public Education After VMI: The Case for Women's
Schools, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 46 n.184 (1998).
34 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1). A Title IX regulation provides that "[a] recipient shall not, on
the basis of sex, exclude any person from admission to any institution of vocational education
operated by that recipient." 34 C.F.R. § 106.35 (2007). This provision mirrors the Title IX
statute, whose prohibition against discrimination on the basis of gender in admissions applies
to "institutions of vocational education." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1).
35 See Verna L. Williams, Reform or Retrenchment? Single-Sex Education and the Con-
struction of Race and Gender, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 15, 79 n.89 (2004) ("Title IX does not apply
to admissions policies in nonvocational elementary and secondary schools." (citing Nondis-
crimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Finan-
cial Assistance, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276, 11,281 (Mar. 9, 2004) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt.
2008]
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not be prohibited, and public primary and secondary schools would not
be prohibited under Title IX."' 36
While the statute carves out an exception for recipients to imple-
ment certain single-sex schools, the statute does not specify satisfactory
justifications for single-sex schools. 37 The statute does not mention re-
medial or affirmative action at all. Therefore, the statute does not clearly
indicate whether single-sex non-vocational elementary and secondary,
and private undergraduate schools can be created for affirmative action
purposes. At this stage, scholarship on this topic can only certify that (1)
the statute has eliminated the possibility that single-sex schools may be
created in vocational education, professional education, and graduate
higher education, or in public undergraduate settings, and (2) the statute
has provided an area within which single-sex schools may be created.
Other sources will have to reveal the legitimate purposes for which ad-
ministrators may establish single-sex education.
The Title IX regulation explicitly refers to remedial and affirmative
action. Title 34, section 106.3(a) of the Code of Federal Regulations
provides that "[i]f the Assistant Secretary [for Civil Rights in DOE] finds
that a recipient has discriminated against persons on the basis of sex in
an education program or activity, such recipient shall take such remedial
action as the Assistant Secretary deems necessary to overcome the ef-
fects of such discrimination. ' '38 In addition, 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n the absence of a finding of
discrimination on the basis of sex in an education program or activity, a
recipient may take affirmative action to overcome the effects of condi-
tions which resulted in limited participation therein by persons of a par-
ticular sex."'39
Taking these two provisions together, a recipient must take remedial
action where OCR's Assistant Secretary has determined that the recipient
106))). See also Sherwin, supra note 22, at 53 ("[A]s far as admissions are concerned, [Title
IX] notably does not cover either private undergraduate institutions or schools below the un-
dergraduate level, like public secondary schools.").
36 Jolee Land, Note, Not Dead Yet: The Future of Single-Sex Education After United
States v. Virginia, 27 STETSON L. REV. 297, 322 (1997). This article does not address what
differentiates a public institution from a private one for purposes of Title IX nor, in particular,
for the applicability of the statutory prohibition against discrimination in admissions. For in-
formation on that subject see, for example, Karla Cooper-Boggs, Note, The Link Between
Private and Public Single-Sex Colleges: Will Wellesley Stand or Fall with the Citadel?, 29
IND. L. Rav. 131, 132 (1995), which examines "three legal theories which could be used to
challenge the legality of the admissions policies of private women's colleges."
37 See Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 883 (3rd Cir. 1976)
(recounting how the Senate rejected a version of the statute that "would have required that all
single-sex schools, primary and secondary, public and private, become coeducational").
38 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(a).
39 Id. § 106.3(b).
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has discriminated on the basis of gender,40 but a recipient may also un-
dertake action without such a determination as a means to compensate
for conditions that have resulted in limited opportunities for individuals
of a particular gender.4' Put another way, 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(a) mandates
action and is triggered by a finding of discrimination, whereas 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.3(b) permits voluntary action and merely requires that the "effects
of conditions" that have "resulted in limited participation" of members of
one gender exist. 42
Both 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(a) and 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) do not specify
whether single-sex education may suffice as a form of remedial or af-
firmative action under the Title IX regulations. A common rule provid-
ing for the enforcement of Title IX by several federal agencies, however,
suggests that single-sex programs are permissible, depending on the cir-
cumstances, under 34 C.F.R. § 106.3:
Several comments inquired about the viability of single-
sex programs such as an educational science program
targeted at young women and designed to encourage
their interest in a profession in which they are under-
represented. Such courses may, under appropriate cir-
cumstances, be permissible as part of a remedial or
affirmative action program as provided for by ... these
Title IX regulations. 43
Moreover, a convincing argument can be made that a textual inter-
pretation of 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) contemplates the use of single-sex edu-
cation. As Fred Von Lohmann argues in the Stanford Law Review:
[T]he language of [34 C.F.R. §] 106.3(b) explicitly per-
mits covered institutions to take voluntary affirmative
action even in the absence of an administrative finding
of discrimination. The plain meaning of the words "af-
firmative action" in this context authorizes the use of
40 See Mowery, supra note 22, at 297 ("[Subdivision (a) of 34 C.F.R. § 106 applies to] a
situation in which the Director of the OCR finds that the recipient has discriminated on the
basis of sex. In this situation, the recipient 'shall' take remedial action as deemed necessary by
the Director to overcome the effects of the discrimination.").
41 Id. at 298 ("In [a situation involving 34 C.F.R. § 106(b)], the Director has not found
discrimination. According to the regulations, the recipient in this situation 'may' still take
affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions which caused limited participation by
the members of a particular sex .... ).
42 Id.; see also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 172 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that "a
remedy flowing from a judicial determination of discrimination" in violation of Title IX does
not mean "the remedy constitutes 'affirmative action' ").
43 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. 52,858, 52,861 (Aug. 30, 2000) (to be codified at
49 C.F.R. pt. 25).
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gender-based classifications designed to assist the histor-
ically-disadvantaged gender. Indeed, any other reading
would render the provision superfluous, as remedial
measures employing non-gender classifications would
not fall within the purview of Title IX at all. Congress's
inclusion of [34 C.F.R. §] 106.3(b) thus should be read
to permit some deviation from the general requirement
that institutions administer their educational programs
and activities in a "sex-blind" manner.44
The Department of Justice (DOJ) supports Von Lohmann's conclusion,
that 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) provides for a "deviation" from the general
prohibition against taking gender into account in a recipient's programs
and activities. In a brief submitted to the Supreme Court in United States
v. Virginia, the DOJ, on behalf of the United States, argued, "Affirmative
action that was designed to remedy sex discrimination . . . addresses
harms that are by their nature class-based. '45 If 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b)
permits recipients to address discriminatory conditions, and those dis-
criminatory conditions are gender-based, then, as the United States con-
tends, gender-based measures must compensate recipients. 46
The affirmative action must necessarily take gender into account not
only because of the nature of class-based discriminatory conditions, but
also to preserve the integrity of the regulations. Otherwise, a gender-
neutral affirmative action would essentially violate the general prohibi-
tion against discrimination on the basis of gender, rendering it a complete
nullity.
With the only exception of 20 U.S.C. §1681(a)(1), nothing in the
text of the statute or the regulations suggests that the gender-based reme-
dies should exclude single-sex schools, classes, or activities. As a result,
the Title IX affirmative action provision, 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b), must be
interpreted to allow for class-based (for example, gender-based) compen-
satory measures that include single-sex schools, classes, and activities,
except for the single-sex schools prohibited by 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1). 47
44 Von Lohmann, supra note 23, at 185.
45 Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 12 n. 11, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996) (No. 94-1941) [hereinafter Reply Brief]; accord Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 728 (1982).
46 See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding a provision of the Social
Security Act that permitted women, who, as a class, were subject to economic discrimination,
to eliminate low-earning years in calculating their retirement); cf Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007) ("The way to stop discrimination
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race."); id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment) ("The idea that if race is the problem, race is the
instrument with which to solve it cannot be accepted as an analytical leap forward.").
47 See Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 885 (3rd Cir. 1976)
("Judicial zeal for identity of educational methodology should not lead us to presume that
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2. Purpose of Title IX
While the probative value of legislative history as a means of infer-
ring congressional intent is often subject to debate,48 the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly turned to the principal author of Title IX,
Senator Birch Bayh, for guidance on the statute's meaning.49 The Court
has indicated that it gives considerable weight to Senator Bayh's testi-
mony, noting that "statements by individual legislators should not be
given controlling effect, but, at least in instances where they are consis-
tent with the plain language of Title IX, Senator Bayh's remarks are 'an
authoritative guide to the statute's construction.'- 50 Accordingly, in the
context of Title IX, there is significant justification for discussing the
statements of Senator Bayh, made during the consideration of Title IX.
Senator Bayh clearly expressed that two important policies underlay
Title IX. One was preventing recipients of federal financial assistance
from discriminating against women, and the second was to extend the
protections of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI") to
gender discrimination:
[O]ne of the great failings of the American education
system is the continuation of corrosive and unjustified
discrimination against women .... [T]he heart of this
amendment is a provision banning sex discrimination in
educational programs receiving Federal funds .... Dis-
crimination against the beneficiaries of federally assisted
programs and activities is already prohibited by Title VI
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately the pro-
hibition does not apply to discrimination on the basis of
sex. In order to close this loophole, my amendment sets
forth prohibition and enforcement provisions which gen-
erally parallel the provisions of Title VI.51
Congress would impose such limitations upon the nationwide teaching community by equivo-
cation or innuendo. Congress spoke clearly enough on single-sex schools in 1972 when it
chose to defer action in order to secure the data needed for an intelligent judgment.").
48 Compare FCC v. NextWave Personal Commc'ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 305 (2003)
(opinion authored by Scalia, J.) (criticizing the dissent for relying in part on "ever-available
snippets of legislative history" in discerning the purpose of a statute), with id. at 314-15
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (contending that "the statute's history"-including Senate Reports,
House Reports, and statements from the floor of the House-"demonstrates an anti-discrimi-
natory objective").
49 See, e.g., Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1984); N. Haven Bd. of
Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 537 (1982); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696 n.19
(1979).
50 Grove City, 465 U.S. at 567 (quoting N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 527).
51 118 CONG. Rac. S5803-07 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
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Regarding admissions, Senator Bayh noted that "discrimination af-
fects the greatest number of women... [in] admissions to undergraduate,
graduate, professional, and vocational institutions of education. '52 The
Senator continued:
The discriminatory effect of sex segregation in voca-
tional education is that many fields which are designated
for females such as cosmetology or food handling are
less technical and therefore less lucrative than fields
such as TV repair and auto mechanics "reserved" for
males. And yet it is only tradition which keeps women
out of these fields .... If women can receive agricul-
tural, electronic, or mechanical training in some pro-
grams, they should be able to receive that same training
in all programs.5 3
Given Senator Bayh's remarks, one would expect the statute's pro-
hibition against discrimination to actually apply to "institutions of voca-
tional education, professional education, and graduate higher education,
and to public institutions of undergraduate higher education. '54
The House version of the bill was far more expansive and "would
have required that all single-sex schools, primary and secondary, public
and private, become coeducational. '55 The Senate, however, narrowed
the scope of the House bill. Senator Bayh, who sponsored a "limiting
amendment," 56 stated candidly that, "no one even knows how many sin-
gle-sex schools exist on the elementary and secondary levels or what
special qualities of the schools might argue for a continued single-sex
status."'57 As a result, he contended that a "study is needed on the ques-
tion of requiring them to admit students of both sexes .... After these
questions have been properly addressed, then Congress can make a fully
informed decision on the question of which-if any-schools should be
exempted. '58 Consequently, the prohibition against discrimination in ad-
mission applied only to institutions where discrimination was clearly
documented, and did not apply to others where further inquiry was
52 Id. at 5805 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh). Senator Bayh cited
Massachusetts as an example, where "there are 17 secondary vocational schools for boys and
[comparatively only] three secondary vocational schools for girls." Id. at 5806 (daily ed. Feb.
28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
53 Id. at 5806 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
54 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(l) (2006).
55 Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 883 (3rd Cir. 1976).
56 Sherwin, supra note 22, at 54-55 n.l 13.
57 118 CONG. REC. S5803, 5804 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
58 Id. at 5807 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh). Senator Bayh predicted
that "many of these exemptions [for some types of schools, based on feasibility,] will not be
supportable after further study and discussion." Id. (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of
Sen. Bayh).
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needed. The lack of information available to Congress regarding indi-
vidual institutions was effectively a safe harbor within which single-sex
education could operate.
The legislative history of Title IX regarding affirmative action is
extremely limited, 59 perhaps because Title IX was intended to track Title
VI. Specifically, Title VI contained a voluntary affirmative action provi-
sion, which the Title IX drafters adopted nearly verbatim. 60 In light of
the fact that Title IX essentially mirrors the voluntary affirmative action
provision of Title VI, it is perhaps unsurprising that 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b)
was inserted with little fanfare. It appears logical that the Title IX draft-
ers would find the remedial measures envisioned by the Title VI drafters
to be equally attractive.
Despite the sparseness of Title IX's history, Senator Bayh's remarks
clearly indicate that Title IX was intended to address "the continuation of
corrosive and unjustified discrimination against women."'6' As a result,
"the heart" of Senator Bayh's legislation "is a provision banning sex dis-
crimination in educational programs receiving Federal funds."'62 The Ti-
tle IX affirmative action provision, 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b), permits
recipients to "take affirmative action to overcome the effects of condi-
tions which resulted in limited participation therein by persons of a par-
ticular sex." Importantly, a recipient need not wait for a finding by a
formal body of discrimination before it addresses the effects of discrimi-
natory conditions. 63 Under 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b), recipients with the
ability to combat gender discrimination sooner rather than later. By pro-
viding recipients with a tool to be proactive in remedying discrimination,
34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) furthers Title IX's fundamental purpose to eradicate
the discriminatory conditions that limit the educational opportunities of
women.
In addition, the discriminatory conditions themselves need not rise
to the level of conclusive discrimination for those conditions to be ad-
dressed.64 Regulation 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) enables recipients to address
59 See Von Lohmann, supra note 23, at 183 ("The legislative history of Title IX does not
indicate a clear congressional intention regarding affirmative action.").
60 See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(6)(ii) (2007) ("Even in the absence of such prior discrimina-
tion, a recipient in administering a program may take affirmative action to overcome the ef-
fects of conditions which resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular race,
color, or national origin.").
61 118 CoNo. REc. S5803 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
62 Id.
63 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 290 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment) (recognizing "this Court's and Congress' consistent
emphasis on 'the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of the law'" (quoting
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 364 (1978)).
64 See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 815 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[A]n entity should not
have to wait for its own liability to minorities to be proved conclusively in litigation before it
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discriminatory conditions before conditions are entrenched in the recipi-
ent's practices, or socially widespread. Without the affirmative action
provision of Title IX, recipients could remedy gender discrimination
when compelled to do so, which would only be when discrimination is so
severe that it is legally actionable. Regulation 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b)
helps to prevent the perpetuation and expansion of gender-based discrim-
inatory conditions by enabling recipients to take remedial steps before
the conditions are beyond correction.
If 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) advances the purpose of Title IX by permit-
ting recipients to address limited educational opportunities for women,
the methods that recipients may use under 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) must
further the purpose of Title IX as well. As one commentator theorized,
"a vocational education class in auto mechanics" for women would be
"justified" where it was "shown that women had been barred from pursu-
ing that vocation, and that having a class consisting predominantly of
men could discourage women from taking the class or result in women
dropping out due to harassment or other forms of sex discrimination. 65
A single-sex class for women in this instance appears to further Senator
Bayh's vision for Title IX in that women are provided with an opportu-
nity in an educational area that they were, as a class, barred or discour-
aged from pursuing.
To better appreciate the argument that single-sex education is a
means of achieving Title IX goals, it is helpful to examine an actual
single-sex affirmative action program. In 2001, DOE published a report
that "identifled] promising and exemplary programs that promote gender
equity in and through education. '66 Out of over one hundred reviewed
programs, the report recommended eleven-one considered "exemplary"
and ten "promising. '67
The only exemplary program identified in the report was a single-
sex vocational education program that was "designed to assist
socioeconomically disadvantaged women to explore and successfully
enter high-wage careers in nontraditional fields in which they have been
under-represented," including construction, manufacturing, transporta-
tion, protective services, and web-design. 68 According to the report,
"The purpose of the program was to help participants," who included
incarcerated women and women on welfare, "overcome multiple barriers
could undertake remedial action." (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgement)).
65 Sara Mandelbaum, Constitutional, Statutory, and Policy Issues Raised by All-Female
Public Education, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 81, 91 (1997).
66 GENDER EQUITY EXPERT PANEL, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PUBL's No. ORAD
2001-1000, EXEMPLARY & PROMISING GENDER EQUITY PROGRAMS 2000 (2001).
67 Id. at 1-2.
68 Id. at 6.
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and become economically self-sufficient. '69 Participation in the program
was voluntary. 70 The report praised the completion rate of program par-
ticipants, the ability of the program to place participants into the
workforce or into further training programs, and the decrease in the par-
ticipants' rate of recidivism. 71 The report also noted that the program
was "successfully replicated in multiple sites" and that it has "excellent
potential for use by others. '72 This program, along with the other pro-
grams given high ratings, shows that single-sex affirmative action can
advance the purpose of Title IX.
Based on the preceding analysis of text and purpose, single-sex af-
firmative action programs are permissible under the Title IX statute and
its implementing regulations, with the sole exception that single-sex vo-
cational education, professional education, graduate, and public institu-
tions of undergraduate schools may not be established pursuant to the
Title IX statute, at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1).
3. A Response to Garrett
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to address two aspects of a
ruling by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan in Garrett v. Board of Education.73 In Garrett, the plaintiffs
claimed a public school district's proposed "establishment of male-only
academies" violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Title IX, and other state provisions. 74 The plaintiffs moved
"to enjoin the [school board] from taking any further steps to implement
the male academies."7 5
With respect to the legality of the male-only academies under Title
IX, the school board argued that the Title IX statute "excludes from cov-
erage, admission plans in kindergarten through grade twelve." The court
thus was forced to interpret the meaning of the Title IX statute, at 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1), which applies its prohibition against discrimination
in admissions to "institutions of vocational education, professional edu-
cation, and graduate higher education, and to public institutions of under-
graduate higher education" and thus permits single-sex education in
institutions not covered by this provision. The court "view[ed] this ex-
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 8. It is important to note that the report focused on the program's effectiveness
and did not address whether and to what extent it complied with prevailing constitutional or
statutory law. See id. at 7 ("Those interested in replicating the ... program must ensure that it
is operated consistently with Title IX .... and with the Title IX regulation [34 C.F.R §] 106.34
(access to course offerings) and [34 C.F.R §] 106.3 (remedial and affirmative action).").
72 Id. at 15.
73 Garrett v. Bd. of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
74 Id. at 1005.
75 Id.
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emption for admissions as applicable primarily to historically pre-ex-
isting single sex schools," not as "authorization to establish new single-
sex schools."76
The school board noted, in part, that the male-only academies were
authorized under the affirmative action provision of the Title IX regula-
tion, 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b). 77 The court, however, deferred to a 1988
OCR statement that ostensibly held that "all male public elementary and
secondary school programs violate Title IX."7 8
First, the district court interpreted 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) to exempt
from Title IX's coverage admissions "to historically pre-existing single
sex schools." 79 As a result, the district court concluded that this statutory
provision "is not viewed as authorization to establish new single sex
schools." 80
To the extent that the district court's 1991 interpretation has any
merit, the recent actions of the DOE functionally supersede and should
rebut any residual notion that the Title IX statute does not permit the
establishment of new single-sex schools. In particular, the DOE
amended Title IX regulations to clarify that recipients could offer single-
sex classes and schools, as long as this was done in a non-discriminatory
manner and in compliance with Title IX regulations.8' The regulation, at
34 C.F.R. § 106.34(c)(1), provides that "a recipient that operates a public
nonvocational elementary or secondary school that excludes from admis-
sion any students, on the basis of sex, must provide students of the ex-
cluded sex a substantially equal single-sex school or coeducational
school." A regulation that aims to "expand flexibility for recipients to
provide single-sex education"8 2 and then provides a requirement for re-
cipients to implement single-sex schools in particular83 surely contem-
plates the creation of new single-sex schools.
Interpreting the statute to prohibit the creation of new single-sex
schools would also appear to conflict with 34 C.F.R. § 106.3, which im-
plicates compensatory action that may take place in the future-i.e., re-
medial action in response to a finding of discrimination and affirmative
action even in the absence of such a finding. As a result, the district
76 Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Re-
ceiving Federal Financial Assistance, 71 Fed. Reg. 62,529 (Oct. 25, 2006) (to be codified at 34
C.F.R. pt. 106).
82 Id. at 62,531 (emphasis added).
83 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(c)(1) (2007).
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court's view of 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) does not appear to be a reasona-
ble construction of the statute.
Second, in rejecting the recipient's claim that a single-sex school
was authorized by 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b), the district court deferred to an
OCR "ruling" that ostensibly held that "all male public elementary and
secondary school programs violate Title IX.' '84 To the extent that this
OCR case had any precedential value, OCR's subsequent actions demon-
strate that it no longer follows the "ruling" described in the district court
opinion.8 5 Indeed, the 2006 single-sex regulatory amendments, which
allow for single-sex schools provided that a substantially equal single-
sex school is also offered,8 6 suggest strongly that DOE does not consider
single-sex schools to be prohibited by Title IX. 87
It is now appropriate to turn to the constitutionality of single-sex
education established pursuant to the affirmative action provision of Title
Ix.
B. SINGLE-SEX AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS ARE
CONSTITUTIONAL, DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Overview of Constitutional Analysis of Gender-Based
Classifications Generally
A party challenging the legality of single-sex schools, classes, or
activities established pursuant to Title IX, at 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b), will
likely bring claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which prohibits states from denying to any person equal
protection of the laws, 88 as well as under Title IX. As Title IX is "coex-
tensive with the Equal Protection Clause, the test for determining liabil-
ity under [Title IX] is the same as the test for determining liability under
the Equal Protection Clause."8 9 Indeed, the leading Supreme Court cases
in this subject proceed under an equal protection analysis. 90
84 Id.
85 Another commentator has suggested that, in any case, the OCR "ruling" discussed in
Garrett is of little value because the court did not provide any insight into OCR's legal reasons
for its conclusion. See Von Lohmann, supra note 23, at 194 ("The court in Garrett did not
explain OCR's rationale for opposing all-male academies, nor did the court express an opinion
regarding the applicability of § 106.3(b). As a result, Garrett does not shed much light on the
appropriate Title IX analysis for gender-based affirmative action initiatives.").
86 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(c)(1) (2006).
87 An exception, of course, is the statutory prohibition against discrimination in admis-
sions that applies to vocational, professional, graduate, and public undergraduate institutions.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (2007).
88 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person ... the equal
protection of the laws.").
89 William E. Thro, Judicial Paradigms of Educational Equality, 174 EDuc. LAW REP. 1,
17 n.56 (April 24, 2003).
90 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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According to the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, a
"party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis
of their gender must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persua-
sive justification' for the classification." 91 Single-sex schools, classes, or
activities, which by their nature classify applicants and/or students on the
basis of gender, are inherently gender-based classifications and thus re-
quire an "exceedingly persuasive justification" to survive constitutional
muster.9
2
To satisfy the burden of showing an "exceedingly persuasive justifi-
cation," "the defender of the challenged classification must show 'at least
that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that
the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.'1, 93 As a result, the party seeking to
preserve a single-sex program in court first must proffer an "important
governmental objective" for the gender-based classification, here a sin-
gle-sex school, class, or activity. As part of this test, the party must
demonstrate that the classification "intentionally and directly assists
members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened" 94 and that
"members of the gender benefited by the classification actually suffer a
disadvantage related to the classification." 95
The defender of the gender-based classification must pass this con-
stitutional hurdle even if the classification is allegedly based on benign
justifications. 96 A searching examination into the actual purposes of the
gender-based classification enables the courts to "'smoke out' illegiti-
mate uses" of gender to ensure that "there is little or no possibility that
the motive for the classification was illegitimate ... prejudice or stereo-
91 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981));
Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979). The requirement of an "exceed-
ingly persuasive justification" appears to be interchangeable with, and does not seem to alter
or add to, what is commonly known as "intermediate scrutiny." See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 559
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (commenting that the phrase "'exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion' . .. is best confined, as it was first used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the
applicable test, not as a formulation of the test itself"); Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of South Fla.
Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 907-08 (11 th Cir. 1997) ("[A]lthough the phrase
'exceedingly persuasive justification' has more linguistic verve than conventional descriptions
of intermediate scrutiny, it does not necessarily follow that a new constitutional standard for
judging gender preferences is embodied in that phrase.").
92 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531-46 (evaluating the constitutional merits of the all-male
Virginia Military Institute based on this standard).
93 Id. at 524 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724).
94 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728.
95 Id.
96 See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) ("[T]he mere recitation of a
benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry
into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.").
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type."' 9 7 Accordingly, single-sex schools and classes, even if offered to
compensate for discriminatory conditions, as contemplated by 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.3(b), nevertheless must contend with the "exceedingly persuasive
justification" standard. 98
2. Application of the Equal Protection Framework to Voluntary
Affirmative Action
Federal courts have understood and embraced the bifurcated struc-
ture of 34 C.F.R. § 106.3; there is a difference between remedial efforts
in response to a formal finding of discrimination, 9 9 on one hand, and
voluntary affirmative action in the absence of such a finding on the
other. 100 With respect to the latter, the focus of this Article, the courts
have recognized that a formal finding of discrimination is not a prerequi-
site for voluntary affirmative action. 10 1
In addition, federal courts have held that voluntary affirmative ac-
tion measures are generally permissible under the Constitution and Title
IX. The Supreme Court, for example, has observed that, "Sex classifica-
tions may be used to compensate women 'for particular economic disa-
bilities [they have] suffered."' 10 2 Moreover, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, citing to 34 C.F.R. § 106.3, held that "voluntary
affirmative action to overcome the effects of gender discrimination are
permitted under the Title IX regulations,"' 1 3 while the Second Circuit
similarly noted that "voluntary affirmative action measures to overcome
effects of historical conditions that have limited participation by mem-
bers of one sex are authorized by the [Title IX] regulation.'0 4
In respect of the two-pronged "exceedingly persuasive justification"
standard, the Supreme Court has suggested that undertaking measures to
compensate one gender for historical or identifiable discrimination is an
"important governmental objective." For example, in Califano v. Web-
ster, the Court upheld a provision on the Social Security Act, noting that
97 See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion) (explaining why the Court applies strict scrutiny to race-based classifications, even
where benign justifications are put forth for the classifications).
98 See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730-31.
99 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(a) (2007).
100 See id. § 106.3(b); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
1l See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 289 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[A] contemporaneous or antecedent finding of
past discrimination by a court or other competent body is not a constitutional prerequisite to a
public employer's voluntary agreement to an affirmative action plan.").
102 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313, 320 (1977)).
103 See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 171 n.ll (lst Cir. 1996).
104 McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 297 n.20
(2nd Cir. 2004) (citing Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,416 (Dec. 11, 1982) (to be codi-
fied at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86)).
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"[r]eduction of the disparity in economic condition between men and wo-
men caused by the long history of discrimination against women has
been recognized as such an important governmental objective."l 0 5 As to
the substantial relationship between the gender-based classification and
the important objective, the Webster Court remarked approvingly that the
statute under review "operated directly to compensate women for past
economic discrimination."' 0 6
In the context of education, two seminal Supreme Court cases have
addressed whether single-sex education complies with the requirement of
an "exceedingly persuasive justification." In both cases, the Supreme
Court struck down the single-sex schools at issue, holding that they vio-
lated the equal protection promise of the Constitution. In invalidating the
single-sex schools, the cases provide doctrinal rules that may apply to
other single-sex opportunities created pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b).
As these cases explain why the single-sex programs must fall, they serve
as indispensable guidance in determining when single-sex education af-
firmative action programs may be implemented in a manner consistent
with the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX.
The first of the critically important cases was brought by Joe Hogan,
a male who "was denied admission to the [Mississippi University for
Women] ("MUW")] School of Nursing solely because of his sex." 1°7
MUW, a public institution, "limited its enrollment to women." 10 8 Ho-
gan's ensuing suit claimed this single-sex admissions policy violated the
Equal Protection Clause.10 9 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Mississippi, applying a "rational relationship test,"
denied plaintiff relief.°10 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that intermediate scrutiny governed the court's review
of the admissions policy and that, under this standard, "[t]he policy of
MUW that excludes Hogan because of his sex denies him the equal pro-
tection of the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment."''
In defending its single-sex admissions policy before the Supreme
Court, MUW attempted to satisfy the first prong of the equal protection
rubric by arguing that its single-sex admissions policy "compensate[d]
105 Webster, 430 U.S. at 317 (1977) (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975);
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)). The Court in Schlesinger upheld a statutory provision
that responded to the "demonstrable fact that male and female line officers in the Navy are not
similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional service." 419 U.S. at 508.
Note, however, that the statute at issue was reviewed under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See id. at 506.
106 Webster, 430 U.S. at 318.
107 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720-21 (1982).
1o8 Id. at 720.
109 Id. at 721.
110 Id.
III Hogan v. Miss. Univ. for Women, 646 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1981).
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for discrimination against women and, therefore, constitute[d] educa-
tional affirmative action." 1 2 As noted above, the mere recitation of a
compensatory purpose does not excuse the challenged classification from
a searching inquiry into the actual bases for said classification. Accord-
ingly, the Court examined the proffered compensatory justification and
determined that MUW had "made no showing that women lacked oppor-
tunities to obtain training in the field of nursing or to attain positions of
leadership in that field when the MUW School of Nursing opened its
door or that women currently are deprived of such opportunities."'1 13
The Court concluded that MUW had not only failed to meet its burden of
demonstrating that sufficient discriminatory conditions existed to justify
a single-sex admissions policy, but also that the policy further en-
trenched archaic and stereotypical views of female roles in society. 14 In
short, not only did MUW fail to adequately prove that women were in
need of affirmative action, but worse, it's admission policies perpetuated
the harmful notion that nursing is only a woman's job.
With respect to the second prong of the equal protection analysis,
the Court found that the single-sex admissions policy was not substan-
tially related to the stated objective of compensating women for limited
educational opportunities, as "MUW's policy of permitting men to attend
classes as auditors fatally undermines its claim that women, at least those
in the School of Nursing, are adversely affected by the presence of
men." " 5 In other words, it is incongruous to argue that the single-sex
admissions policy is designed to provide only females with opportunities
they have been denied when men are permitted to avail themselves of
those same opportunities, albeit on a non-degree basis. As MUW did not
satisfy the equal protection test, the Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the Fifth Circuit."16
In the second seminal case, the United States filed suit against the
Commonwealth of Virginia and the Virginia Military Institute
("VMI")-an all-male public undergraduate institution, and Virginia's
only single-sex school of higher learning, whose mission was to "pro-
duce 'citizen-soldiers'" 1'7-contending that VMI's "exclusively male
admission policy" was invalid on equal protection grounds." 18 The dis-
trict court "rejected the equal protection challenge pressed by the United
112 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727.
113 Id. at 729.
114 See id, ("Rather than compensate for discriminatory barriers faced by women, [Missis-
sipi University for Women's] policy of excluding males from admission to the School of
Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job.").
115 Id. at 730.
116 Id. at 732.
''7 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 520 (1996).
118 Id. at 523.
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States."' 19 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed,
holding that "[t]he Commonwealth of Virginia has not ... advanced any
state policy by which it can justify its determination, under an announced
policy of diversity, to afford VMI's unique type of program to men and
not to women." 20 The Fourth Circuit remanded the case and "assigned
to Virginia . . . responsibility for selecting a remedial course."'1 2 1 The
circuit court offered three options to Virginia: "[a]dmit women to VMI;
establish parallel institutions or programs; or abandon state support, leav-
ing VMI free to pursue its policies as a private institution." 22 Virginia
selected the second option and proposed to create the Virginia Women's
Institute for Leadership ("VWIL"), an all-female institution that
"share[s] VMI's mission-to produce 'citizen-soldiers.'"123 The district
court and the Fourth Circuit subsequently approved Virginia's plan to set
up VWIL, with the latter court taking a deferential look at Virginia's
stated objective but looked into the means employed with "greater scru-
tiny."' 124 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1995 to resolve two
questions: whether VMI's single-sex admissions policy violated the
Equal Protection Clause, and if so, what "remedial requirement" was re-
quired under the Constitution. 125
Before assessing whether Virginia's challenged gender-based classi-
fication was permissible under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
clarified the Equal protection test itself.126 The Court disapproved of the
Fourth Circuit's deferential examination of Virginia's stated governmen-
tal objective, noting that a "reviewing court must determine whether the
proffered justification is 'exceedingly persuasive.' "127 The Court elabo-
rated, explaining that the "burden of justification is demanding" and that
"it rests entirely on the State." 128
In respect of the first prong of the equal protection analysis, Vir-
ginia attempted to justify VMI's single-sex admissions policy by arguing
that: (1) "single-sex education provides important educational benefits"
and "the option of single-sex education contributes to diversity in educa-
119 Id.
120 Id. at 524-25 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992),
affd, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
121 Id. at 525.
122 Id. at 525-26.
123 Id. at 526.
124 Id. at 527-28 (discussing United States v. Virgina, 852 F. Supp. 471, 476-77 (W.D.
Va. 1994), affd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) and Virginia, 44
F.3d at 1236). See also id. at 530-31 (summarizing the two questions the Court set to resolve
in the case).
125 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 530-31.
126 Id. at 532.
127 Id. at 533.
128 Id.
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tional approaches," and (2) VMI's "adversative approach[ ] would have
to be modified were VMI to admit women."1 29 Acknowledging that
"[s]ingle-sex education affords pedagogical benefits to at least some stu-
dents" and that "diversity among public educational institutions can
serve the public good," the Court determined that Virginia nevertheless
did not "show[ ] that VMI was established, or has been maintained, with
a view to diversifying, by its categorical exclusion of women, educa-
tional opportunities within the Commonwealth." 130 Indeed, "A purpose
genuinely to advance an array of educational options ... is not served by
VMI's historic and constant . . . plan to 'affor[d] a unique educational
benefit only to males.' "131
As to Virginia's argument that "VMI's adversative method... can-
not be made available, unmodified, to women,"'' 32 the Court, in an opin-
ion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, unearthed expert witness
statements made below and stated that some women "have the will and
capacity" to attend VMI.' 33 As a result, the Court was compelled to
address whether Virginia could constitutionally deny all women the "the
training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely affords."' 134
The Court noted preliminarily that the government "may not ex-
clude qualified individuals based on 'fixed notions concerning the roles
and abilities of males and females,' "1 35 or "rely on 'overbroad' general-
izations to make 'judgments about people that are likely to ... perpetuate
historical patterns of discrimination.' 1 36 The Court ultimately rejected
the idea that admitting female cadets would be incompatible with VMI's
adversarial nature: "The notion that admission of women would down-
grade VMI's stature, destroy the adversative system and, with it, even the
school, is a judgment hardly proved, a prediction hardly different from
other 'self-fulfilling prophec[ies],' once routinely used to deny rights or
opportunities." 137 Accordingly, the Court concluded, rather sharply, that
"the Commonwealth's great goal is not substantially advanced by wo-
129 Id. at 535 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
130 Id. The Court observed that it was reaching a result similar to Hogan, in that there
was "no close resemblance between 'the alleged objective' and 'the actual purpose underlying
the discriminatory classification."' Id. at 536 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 730).
131 Id. at 539-40 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992),
affd, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
132 Id. at 540.
133 Id. at 542.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 541 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725).
136 Id. at 541-42 (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.ll (1994)).
137 Id. at 542-43 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730 (1982)).
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men's categorical exclusion, in total disregard of their individual merit,
from the Commonwealth's premier 'citizen-soldier' corps."' 138
Disposing of the first question posed to it, and answering that Vir-
ginia's categorical exclusion of women from VMI failed to comply with
the Equal Protection Clause's guarantee, the Court turned its attention to
the "remedial course" that received the imprimatur of the lower courts,
specifically the creation of VWIL. The Court disagreed with the district
and circuit courts that VWIL was an adequate remedial measure, holding
that establishing VWIL was not a sufficient remedy for the constitutional
violation because "VWIL does not qualify as VMI's equal" in several
important respects, including its faculty and course offerings. 39
With respect to the government's views on the subject, DOJ, argu-
ing on behalf of the United States, has contended in briefs submitted to
the Supreme Court that single-sex education can further the important
governmental interest of compensating for existing discriminatory condi-
tions related to gender.140 In Virginia, for example, DOJ claimed, "The
exclusion of one sex from a program reserved for the other ... can be a
means to achieve an important (or compelling) governmental goal, such
as eradication of the effects of discrimination in the existing educational
system."' 41 Indeed, quoting Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
DOJ argued that, "public single-sex education may be permissible based
on a 'compensatory purpose' if it were shown that 'members of the gen-
der benefited by the classification actually suffer a disadvantage related
to the classification."' 142 DOJ, however, cautioned that single-sex edu-
cation cannot be used to advance stereotypical views of either gender. 143
During oral argument before the Supreme Court, the DOJ advocate
stated, "[ I] don't think that you can have single sex education that offers
to men a stereotypical view of this is what men do." 144 Offering a hypo-
thetical reminiscent of the facts of Hogan, the DOJ official noted,
"[W]hat you can't do... is say we're going to have a single sex school
for men which is the engineering school, and it's the only engineering
138 Id. at 545-46.
139 Id. at 551 (finding that "VWIL's student body, faculty, course offerings, and facilities
hardly match VMI's. Nor can the VWIL graduate anticipate the benefits associated with
VMI's 157-year history, the school's prestige, and its influential alumni network.").
140 Brief for Petitioner at 45 n.32, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (No. 94-
1941) [hereinafter Opening Brief].
141 Id.
142 Id. (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728).
143 See id. at 18 ("[Virginia's proposed corrective action] was designed, defended, and
approved through the use of impermissible sex-stereotypes and overgeneralizations about the
capacities and aspirations of 'most' men and 'most' women. Equal protection precludes reli-
ance on such stereotypes and generalizations to foreclose individual opportunity.").
144 Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
(Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107).
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school we have . . . and we're going to have a single sex school for
women which is a nursing school."' 145
As for the means used for a legitimate compensatory end, DOJ cited
approvingly to Califano, noting that "[a] class-based response . . .
may ... be necessary" for "harms that are by their nature class-based."' 146
DOJ also argued that the Court previously upheld the gender-based clas-
sification in Califano because it "'was deliberately enacted to compen-
sate for particular economic disabilities suffered by women' in the job
market, and it 'work[ed] directly to remedy some part of the effect of
past discrimination.' "147
In Virginia, DOJ argued that the "remedial course" proposed by
Virginia, namely the creation of VWIL, an all-female academy that par-
alleled VMI, was insufficient. 148 More specifically, DOJ contended that
VWIL cannot be the "only alternative for women who are ready and
willing to compete alongside men without it.' 149 Moreover, as the
"Court has never approved an affirmative action plan as a justification
for excluding qualified women ... from a non-affirmative-action alterna-
tive," according to DOJ, the establishment of VWIL did not cure the
constitutional injury, namely the exclusion of women from VMI, because
some women were willing and able to attend VMI and endure its adver-
sarial method. 150
3. Single-Sex Affirmative Action Programs Can Serve an
Important Governmental Objective
As the Supreme Court announced in Hogan, gender-based classifi-
cations must have an "exceedingly persuasive justification;" in other
words, the gender-based classification must have "important governmen-
tal objectives" and "the discriminatory means employed" must be "sub-
stantially related to the achievement of those objectives."' 151 Single-sex
education programs, which classify applicants or students on the basis of
gender, are inherently gender-based classifications that are amenable to
the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard.
145 Id. at 15.
146 Reply Brief, supra note 45, at 12 n.ll.
147 Id. (quoting Calfino v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 318, 320 (1977)).
148 See id. at 1-2.
149 Id. at 4 n.6.
150 Id.; see also id. at 12 n. 11.
151 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Wengler v.
Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that compensating
one gender for discrimination is an important governmental objective. 52
In Webster, the Court stated that "[r]eduction of the disparity in eco-
nomic condition between men and women caused by the long history of
discrimination against women has been recognized as such an important
governmental objective."' 53 In the educational context, the Court noted
in Hogan that, "a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be
justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is
disproportionately burdened."154
A recipient that implements a single-sex education program, how-
ever, must ensure that it follows the Court's guidance in Hogan-i.e. that
the gender-based classification "intentionally and directly assists mem-
bers of the sex that is disproportionately burdened"'155 and that "members
of the gender benefited by the classification actually suffer a disadvan-
tage related to the classification."'' 5 6 Put another way, the important gov-
ernmental objective for the gender-based classification may not serve as
a guise for a clandestine, invidious purpose, such as perpetuating stereo-
types about the social roles or abilities of males or females. 157
Accordingly, a recipient implementing a single-sex affirmative ac-
tion program may argue that the program directly benefits women who
were historically steered into certain professions. For example, a single-
sex carpentry class may benefit women because women have been his-
torically directed away from carpentry educational or vocational pro-
grams.' 58 A recipient hoping to implement a similar single-sex
education program should not argue that the program directly compen-
sates for discriminatory conditions when the program itself reinforces
152 The proposition has also been supported by the federal circuit courts. See McCormick
v. Mamaroneck School Dist. 370 F.3d 275, 297 n.20 (2004); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d
155, 171-72 n.ll (1st Cir. 1996).
153 Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498 (1975) and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)). The Court in Schlesinger upheld a
statutory provision that responded to the "demonstrable fact that male and female line officers
in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional service."
419 U.S. at 508. Note, however, that the statute at issue was reviewed under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
154 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541-42 (1996); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511
U.S. 127, 139 n.ll (1994); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360
(1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("[W]e nonetheless have recognized that the line between honest and
thoughtful appraisal of the effects of past discrimination and paternalistic stereotyping is not so
clear and that a statute based on the latter is patently capable of stigmatizing all women with a
badge of inferiority.").
158 See Mandelbaum, supra note 65, at 91.
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stereotypical views of women. This was the situation in Hogan, which
invalidated an all-female nursing program where there was no evidence
that women were denied opportunities in nursing and the program actu-
ally served to perpetuate the wrongful notion that nursing is an all-female
occupation. 159 This was also the case in Virginia, which invalidated an
all-male military institution, in part because the recipient argued that the
institution's adversarial system could not be offered unmodified to wo-
men where there was evidence that women, in fact, had the ability and
desire to attend the institution and participate in its adversarial
program. 60
Simply because the Supreme Court has invalidated the only two sin-
gle-sex education programs which have come before it does not suggest,
by any means, that single-sex programs as a general matter are disfa-
vored by the Court or can never be implemented in a manner consistent
with the Equal Protection Clause. The recipients in Hogan and Virginia,
however, committed fatal errors that, in retrospect, are fairly obvious and
may be avoided with relative ease. In any case, in Webster, the Court
upheld a gender-conscious affirmative action policy, even though it was
not in the educational context. 6' Provided that a recipient is mindful of
the cautionary tales of Hogan, and its progeny, single-sex education as
an affirmative action program can satisfy the first prong of the "exceed-
ingly persuasive justification" standard as set forth in Hogan.
4. Single-Sex Affirmative Action Programs Can be Substantially
Related to the Important Governmental Objective
A gender-based classification must not only further an important
governmental objective, but the program itself must be "substantially re-
lated to the achievement" of the objective.1 62 Accordingly, a single-sex
education program instituted to compensate for the discriminatory condi-
tions that have limited the opportunities of members of one gender must
be substantially related to the achievement of that compensatory
objective. 163
In the "exceedingly persuasive justification" analysis, the second
prong is difficult and misunderstood as a constitutional issue. Indeed, a
number of commentators have not fully grasped the nature of the condi-
tions such a program must meet in order to be substantially related to a
compensatory objective.
159 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729.
160 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 545-46.
161 Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 332 (1976).
162 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142,
150 (1980).
163 See id. at 724-26.
2008]
606 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:579
First, Maryam Ahranjani and Monica J. Stamm suggest that for a
single-sex affirmative action program to be permissible, the three condi-
tions described in a Government Accounting Office ("GAO") report
must be satisfied. 164 In that report, released in 1996 and entitled, "Public
Education: Issues Involving Single-Gender Schools and Programs," the
GAO endeavored to "identify the major educational and legal issues in-
volved with public single-gender education and to cite some examples of
recent public single-gender education programs."' 65 One of these pro-
grams was a single-gender mentoring club established for boys in re-
sponse to "a report on African American male achievement."' 66 A
complaint challenging the legality of the mentoring program under Title
IX was filed with the OCR. 167 According to the GAO report:
OCR noted that single-gender clubs would comport with
Title IX in meeting affirmative action standards only if
(1) those who have experienced conditions resulting in a
limited opportunity to participate in the district's pro-
grams due to their gender are the targeted beneficiaries,
(2) less discriminatory alternatives have been considered
and rejected, and (3) the evidence demonstrates that
comparable gender-neutral means could not be reasona-
bly expected to produce the results desired. 168
The report claimed that OCR had concluded that, "despite the laud-
able goals of the district's program, it did not appear that the means to
achieve those goals had been tailored to comply with the Title IX
regulation." 169
In an appendix to the report, the GAO, citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b),
noted that, "a recipient may take affirmative action to overcome the ef-
fects of conditions that have limited participation by gender." 170 The
appendix to the report, seemingly referring to the second prong of the
Equal Protection Clause analysis, continued, "Regarding affirmative ac-
tion, in particular, the classifications that result in single-gender classes
must be directly related to the reasons for the institution of the single-
gender classes."'17 The GAO then proceeded to list conditions that a
single-sex program must satisfy in order to meet this standard and this
list mirrors the factors established by OCR in the mentoring club case:
164 See Ahranjani, supra note 24, at 197; see also Stamm, supra note 24, at 1217.
165 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL'N No. GAO/HEHS-96-122, PUBLIC EDU-
CATION: ISSUES INVOLVING SINGLE-GENDER SCHOOLS AND PROGRAMS 1 (1996).
166 Id. at 11.
167 Id. at 10.
168 Id. at 11.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 22.
171 Id.
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This means that the (1) beneficiaries of the single-gender
classes or programs must have had limited opportunities
to participate in a school's programs or activities due to
their sex, (2) less restrictive or segregative alternatives
that may have accomplished the goals of the single-gen-
der classes or programs must have been considered and
rejected, and (3) there must be evidence that comparable
sex-neutral means could not be reasonably expected to
produce the results sought through the single-gender
classrooms or programs.1 72
Currently, OCR takes the position that each resolution letter is fact-
specific and cannot be relied upon as a statement of formal binding pol-
icy. The OCR case that the GAO report discusses-and which
Ahranjani and Stamm rely upon in providing guidance on the legality of
single-sex affirmative action programs in education-is not a formal
statement of OCR policy and as such cannot be relied upon as prece-
dent. 173 More specifically, OCR stated in an e-mail response to my
inquiry:
The GAO report language that you cited appears to be
based upon an OCR case resolution letter. These letters
are fact-specific statements of the investigative findings
and dispositions in individual cases and are not formal
statements of OCR policy. They should not be relied on
or cited as formal policy. 174
Therefore, the OCR factors reproduced in the GAO report, and the
Ahranjani and Stamm articles, are not reliable guidance as to how a re-
cipient may permissibly implement a single-sex affirmative action pro-
gram under 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b).
Secondly, Sara Mandelbaum, an attorney with the American Civil
Liberties Union, has claimed that, in addition to reviewing the "goals"
and "procedures" of a single-sex affirmative action program, a court also
should ask: "Are there less restrictive alternatives? Are there sex-neutral
means for achieving the same objectives, such as teacher training,
mentoring programs, after-school programs, and the like?" 175 However,
neither of these conditions is required for single-sex educational program
established pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b). 176
172 Id. at 22-23.
173 Email from OCR to Dawinder Sidhu (June 21, 2007) (on file with author).
174 Id. (emphasis added).
175 See Mandelbaum, supra note 65, at 92.
176 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,426 F.3d 1162, 1180
(9th Cir. 2005) (stating that a narrowly-tailored race-based affirmative action program must
demonstrate "serious, good-faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives").
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In reference to an OCR case, the GAO has suggested that considera-
tion of "less discriminatory alternatives" and "gender-neutral means" are
required for single-sex affirmative action programs. 177 As noted above,
however, the OCR case cited to in the GAO report is not a formal state-
ment of OCR policy and has no binding effect.
Currently, OCR does not mandate the consideration of less-restric-
tive alternatives or gender-neutral means, as evidenced by the promulga-
tion of the Title IX amended regulations.178 Regulation 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.34 enumerates several factors that a recipient must satisfy in order
to establish the legality of single-sex schools, classes, and extracurricular
activities. 17 9 Importantly, none of these require consideration of less-
restrictive alternatives or a gender-neutral means of implementation.
Moreover, as the DOJ has argued, it would seem bizarre to require a
recipient to consider less-restrictive alternatives or gender-neutral means
when 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) permits recipients to address a gender-based
problem that necessitates a gender-based solution.180 It is also notewor-
thy that the Supreme Court, in approving the single-sex policy at issue in
Webster, did not require consideration of less-restrictive alternatives or
gender-neutral means.
Third, Von Lohmann, drawing upon the Supreme Court cases
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber'81 and John-
son v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California,182 offers
three conditions for voluntary single-sex affirmative action programs: (1)
"the purposes of the affirmative action efforts [must] mirror[ ] those of
the [Title IX] statute;" (2) "the affirmative action efforts [must not] un-
necessarily trammel[ ] the rights" of the gender that did not have limited
opportunities; and (3) "affirmative action measures should not outlast the
targeted discrimination."' 183
Von Lohmann's broad suggestion that the purposes of the single-
sex program must parallel the purposes of the Title IX statute attempts to
ensure that a recipient's single-sex program is "designed to remedy lim-
177 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 165, at 1.
178 Cf Mandelbaum, supra note 65, at 92.
179 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)-(c) (2006).
180 Reply Brief, supra note 45, at 12 n. 11. The argument that a gender-based problem
requires a gender-based remedy also explains why two of the other factors of a constitutional
race-conscious affirmative action program-a holistic consideration of the applicants and stu-
dents, and the absence of quotas-is not applicable in the gender-conscious affirmative action
context. See Parents, 426 F.3d at 1180-81. Individualized consideration in a single-sex af-
firmative action program is not necessary because the goal of a single-sex program, under 34
C.F.R. §106.3(b), is not related to diversity. See id. Moreover, a single-sex program is, by its
very nature, 100% male or female. Thus, requiring a program to be free of quotas is not
pertinent. See id.
181 See United States Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
182 See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
183 Von Lohmann, supra note 23, at 196-98.
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ited participation" resulting from gender discrimination. 84 As a result,
the first element of Von Lohmann's guidance reflects the requirement
that the single-sex affirmative action program genuinely advance the ob-
jective of compensating for the discriminatory conditions which have
limited the opportunities of members of one gender. The second element
would mandate an "inquiry [into] the alternatives available to the ex-
cluded group,"1 85 while the third would ensure that the gender-based
classification exists no longer than the factual circumstance give rise to
the necessity of an affirmative action program.
These three factors are critical to a permissible single-sex educa-
tional program instituted under 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b). These factors,
however, are still only part of the constitutional puzzle. Therefore, fur-
ther elaboration on the factors and a discussion of the remaining pieces
are in order.
II. GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SINGLE-SEX
EDUCATION UNDER 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b)
In order to withstand a constitutional challenge, a single-sex school,
class, or extracurricular activity, established pursuant to the affirmative
action provision of the Title IX regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b), must
comply with several conditions. The single-sex program must meet the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" test. 18 6 Moreover, the single-sex
program must serve "important governmental objectives" and "the dis-
criminatory means employed" must be "substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."'' 87
A. IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVE
1. The Single-Sex Affirmative Action Program Must Not
Perpetuate Archaic Gender Stereotypes
With respect to the first prong of the "exceedingly persuasive justi-
fication" rubric, the Supreme Court has previously found that compensat-
ing members of one gender for discrimination is an important
governmental objective. 188 Thus, the implementation of a single-sex ed-
ucation program for affirmative action purposes has been held to be an
important governmental objective.
An appellate court, however, will examine the program to "'smoke
out' illegitimate uses" of gender, and to ensure that "there is little or no
184 Id. at 197.
185 Id. at 198.
186 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
187 See id. (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
188 See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. at 318; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 533 (1996); Opening Brief, supra note 140, at 45 n.32.
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possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate ...
prejudice or stereotype."' 189 A single-sex program will thus fail if a
searching inquiry into the program reveals that the program embodies
"fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females" 190
or "creates or perpetuates the legal, social, and economic inferiority of
women."' 191
2. The Single-Sex Affirmative Action Program Must Intentionally
and Directly Assist a Disadvantaged Gender in a Manner
Related to that Disadvantage
The Court, in Hogan, clarified how a legitimate single-sex program
can be distinguished from one that perpetuates archaic gender-based ste-
reotypes.192 In particular, for an institution to successfully defend its ob-
jective in establishing a single-sex affirmative action program, a recipient
must show that the program "intentionally and directly assists members
of the sex that is disproportionately burdened" and that "members of the
gender benefited by the classification actually suffer a disadvantage re-
lated to the classification."1 93 For example, a single-sex affirmative ac-
tion nursing school for women, where there was no evidence that women
had limited opportunities in nursing, would not meet this requirement. 194
However, an all-female welding course designed to compensate women
for historically being discouraged from such vocational programs would
have better chances of surviving a constitutional attack.
195
B. SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE OBJECTIVE
The second prong of the "exceedingly persuasive justification" stan-
dard requires the means to be "substantially related to the achievement"
189 See Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
190 See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-25.
191 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534; see also Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analy-
sis After United States v. Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public
Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 384 (1999) ("[Dlefenders of a single-sex school must
show that the school does not serve to perpetuate traditional gender identities or roles, and that
it does not worsen women's political or economic standing compared to men .... ).
192 See Jason M. Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United
States v. Virginia's Exceedingly Persuasive Justification Standard, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1169,
1184 (1998).
193 See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728. The evidentiary threshold necessary to justify an affirm-
ative action program is an unresolved question. See also Contractors Ass'n v. Philadelphia, 6
F.3d 990, 1010 (3rd Cir. 1993) (noting that "[flew cases have considered the evidentiary bur-
den needed to satisfy intermediate scrutiny in" the context of voluntary affirmative action
based on gender, and "[t]he Supreme Court gender-preference cases are inconclusive" in this
regard). It would seem reasonable to contend, though, that a party could rely on less evidence
in enacting a gender preference than a racial preference. Id.
194 See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728.
195 See Mandelbaum, supra note 65, at 91.
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of the end, 196 such as to compensate "for the effects of conditions which
resulted in limited participation." 197 The amended Title IX regulations
of 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 permit recipients to offer single-sex schools, clas-
ses, and extracurricular activities for educational (not remedial or com-
pensatory) purposes. Such programs are thus a useful starting point for
ensuring that single-sex programs, established pursuant to 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.3(b), are sufficiently tailored to its compensatory objective. As a
result, before discussing the parallels between 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 and 34
C.F.R. § 103(b), it is necessary to briefly review what the amended regu-
lations provide.
The regulations, at 34 C.F.R. § 106.34, permit recipients to provide
non-vocational sex-segregated classes or extracurricular activities if:
The single-sex classes or extracurricular activities are based on the
important objective:
First, to improve educational achievement of its stu-
dents, through a recipient's overall established policy to
provide diverse educational opportunities, provided that
the single-sex nature of the class or extracurricular activ-
ity is substantially related to achieving that objective;
Second, to meet the particular identified educational
needs of its students, provided that the single-sex nature
of the class or extracurricular activity is substantially re-
lated to achieving that objective.' 98
Concerning whether the programs are substantially related to one of
these objectives under the amended regulations, a recipient can establish
a non-vocational single-sex affirmative action class or activity if: (1) The
objective is implemented "in an evenhanded manner,"' 199 which may re-
quire the recipient to "provide a substantially equal single-sex class or
extracurricular activity for students of the excluded sex." °200 The
amended regulations also list factors that the DOE may consider in deter-
mining whether a "substantially equal" class or extracurricular activity
has been offered. These factors include, but are not limited to:
[T]he policies and criteria of admission, the educational
benefits provided, including the quality, range, and con-
tent of curriculum and other services and the quality and
availability of books, instructional materials, and tech-
196 See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S.
142, 150 (1980).
197 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.3 (b) (2007).
198 See C.F.R. §106.34(b)(l)(i)(A)(B) (2007).
199 Id. § 106.34(b)(1)(ii).
200 Id. § 106.34(b)(2).
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nology, the qualifications of faculty and staff, geo-
graphic accessibility, the quality, accessibility, and
availability of facilities and resources provided to the
class, and intangible features, such as reputation of
faculty; 201
(2) "Student enrollment in a single-sex class or extracurricular ac-
tivity is completely voluntary; '20 2 (3) "The recipient provides to all other
students, including students of the excluded sex, a substantially equal
coeducational class or extracurricular activity in the same subject or ac-
tivity; ' '20 3 and (4) "The recipient ... conduct[s] periodic evaluations to
ensure that":
[The] single-sex classes or extracurricular activities are
based upon genuine justifications and do not rely on
overly broad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of either sex[,] and
[T]hat any single-sex classes or extracurricular activities
are substantially related to the achievement of the impor-
tant objective for the classes or extracurricular
activities.204
As for schools, the amended regulations provide that, "a public
nonvocational elementary or secondary school that excludes from admis-
sion any students, on the basis of sex, must provide students of the ex-
cluded sex a substantially equal single-sex school or coeducational
school.120 5 But, a "non-vocational public charter school that is a single-
school local educational agency under State law may be operated as a
single-sex charter school. '20 6 Accordingly, a substantially equal school
is not required for these charter schools.
1. A Recipient Offering a Single-Sex Affirmative Action Program
Must Offer a Co-Educational Alternative Open to the
Disadvantaged Gender
The first 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 factor, that the recipient must imple-
ment its objective in an evenhanded manner, is based on DOE's view
that the Supreme Court "would uphold the evenhanded provision of sin-
gle-sex public educational opportunities, among a diversity of educa-
201 Id. § 106.34(b)(3).
202 Id. § 106.34(b)(1)(iii).
203 Id. § 106.34(b)(1)(iv).
204 Id. § 106.34(b)(4).
205 Id. § 106.34(c)(1).
206 Id. § 106.34(c)(2).
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tional opportunities. '20 7 DOE cited to the Court's opinion in Virginia, in
which the Court stated that it "do[es] not question the State's prerogative
evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportunities. '20 8 Since the
Court's discussion relates only to the objective of providing diverse edu-
cational opportunities, and not to a compensatory objective, the "even-
handed" requirement does not appear to be applicable to ensuring that a
single-sex affirmative action program is substantially related to the com-
pensatory objective.
Although the first factor is not necessary for a single-sex affirmative
action program, the third factor that a recipient "provide[ ] to all other
students, including students of the excluded sex, a substantially equal
coeducational class or extracurricular activity in the same subject or ac-
tivity" 209 is pertinent.
In Virginia, DOJ, arguing on behalf of the United States, contended
that the creation of VWIL, an all-female military institution, even as an
affirmative action measure, was not an adequate constitutional remedy
for the unconstitutional exclusion of women from VMI, an all-male mili-
tary institution, because "[t]he notion that some women may need an
affirmative action program does not mean that such a program can be the
only alternative for women who are ready and willing to compete along-
side men without it.' '210 DOJ reminded the Supreme Court that it "has
never approved an affirmative action plan as a justification for excluding
qualified women or minority-group members from a non-affirmative-ac-
tion alternative" 211 and that "the kinds of affirmative action that th[e]
Court has upheld, unlike VMI's exclusionary admissions policy do not
completely foreclose to one group the opportunities that are affirmatively
extended to another." 212
Accordingly, in Virginia, if VWIL were established as a single-sex
affirmative action institution, a co-educational alternative would have to
be created because some women "have the will and capacity" to attend
VMI. 213 Consequently, the Court held that Virginia could not constitu-
tionally deny all women the "the training and attendant opportunities that
VMI uniquely affords. 214
207 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 71 Fed. Reg. 62,529 (Oct. 25, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R.
pt. 106).
208 Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 n.7 (1996)).
209 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(iv) (2007).
210 Reply Brief, supra note 45, at 4 n.6.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 12 n.l1.
213 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542.
214 Id.
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To recap, although a gender-based affirmative action program may
help members of one gender overcome the effects of discriminatory con-
ditions, a recipient cannot presume that all members of that gender need
such assistance. In other words, the single-sex program may not be the
only option available, as some members of that gender may be able to
participate along with the non-disadvantaged gender, despite the exis-
tence of effects of discriminatory conditions. Confining members of one
gender to a single-sex affirmative action program may not only limit the
educational opportunities, but may also perpetuate the wrongful notion
that members of that gender can succeed academically only when mem-
bers of the non-disadvantaged gender are not present. In short, a recipi-
ent offering a single-sex education program must simultaneously offer a
co-educational alternative to the single-sex program. The co-educational
alternative must be equal in relevant respects to the single-sex
program.215
2. Enrollment in the Single-Sex Affirmative Action Program
Must Be Completely Voluntary
The third factor of 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1) helps explain why the
second factor is also necessary for single-sex affirmative action pro-
grams. The third factor requires the single-sex program to be "com-
pletely voluntary. '216 The Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974
("EEOA") prohibits public schools from assigning students to a school
"other than to the school closest to the student's home if the effect is to
increase the degree of segregation on the basis of . . . sex" and "to the
school nearest the student's home if the purpose is to segregate students
on the basis of ... sex."'217 The Act thus appears to permit only volun-
tary assignment of students to single-sex public schools.
Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected a
public school district's sex-segregated student assignment plan, noting in
reference to the EEOA, that "all students in the system are assigned to
215 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 551 ("VWIL's student body, faculty, course offerings, and
facilities hardly match VMI's. Nor can the VWIL graduate anticipate the benefits associated
with VMI's 157-year history, the school's prestige, and its influential alumni network."); see
also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950) (comparing a law school that refused to
admit African-Americans with a law school that would admit African-Americans, based on,
among other things, "number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specializa-
tion, size of the student body, scope of the library, availability of law review and similar
activities" and "qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for
greatness in a law school," including "reputation of the faculty, experience of the administra-
tion, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige").
216 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(iii) (2007).
217 Patricia Werner Lamar, Comment, The Expansion of Constitutional and Statutory
Remedies for Sex Segregation in Education: The Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 32 EMORY L.J. 1111, 1143 n. 117 (1983).
ARE BLUE AND PINK THE NEW BROWN?
sexually segregated schools at every level, from entry through gradua-
tion. ' '218 The Fifth Circuit distinguished its case from a Third Circuit
ruling upholding a single-sex school program involving "two, voluntary,
sexually segregated high schools. '219 Accordingly, at least with respect
to public schools, assignment cannot be made with a view towards plac-
ing students in single-sex educational programs. Although the reach of
the EEOA extends only to public schools, a debate exists in academic
literature regarding the distinction between public and private institutions
that has been blurred.220
In any case, as a recipient offering a single-sex affirmative action
program is required, based on the analysis above, to additionally provide
an equal co-educational alternative, it would be impermissible for the
recipient to determine whether a particular member of the disadvantaged
gender is to enroll in the single-sex or the co-educational option. Some
members of the disadvantaged gender may want to avail themselves of
the unique benefits that a single-sex program affords, whereas others
may be interested in participating in the curriculum or activity alongside
members of the non-disadvantaged gender.221 It would be highly inap-
propriate for a recipient to decide on its own who would be more com-
fortable in the single-sex program and who is prepared for the co-
educational experience.
Moreover, the existence of an equal co-educational alternative en-
sures that "the affirmative action efforts [do not] unnecessarily tram-
mel[ ] the rights" of the non-disadvantaged gender.2 22 Members of the
non-disadvantaged gender are not suffering the effects of discriminatory
conditions and thus are not in need of distinct efforts to compensate for
limited educational opportunities in a particular subject or activity. They
are, however, still able to participate in and benefit from an equal
program.2 23
218 U.S. v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 560 F.2d 619, 624-25 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977) (emphasis
added).
219 Id. (emphasis added) (discussing Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d
880 (3rd Cir. 1976)).
220 See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understanding of Status-Conscious-
ness: The Case of Deregulated Education, 50 DuKE L.J. 753, 822-23 n.370 (2000) (citing
several articles that discuss "the general erosion of the distinction between private and public
in our antidiscrimination law," including Mark Tushnet, Public and Private in Education: Is
There a Constitutional Difference?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43 (1991) and Richard S. Kay, The
State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the Independence of Constitutional
Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 342-59 (1993)).
221 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542 (1996).
222 Von Lohmann, supra note 23, at 196.
223 Carolyn B. Ramsey, Subtracting Sexism from the Classroom: Law and Policy in the
Debate Over All-Female Math and Science Classes in Public Schools, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L.
1, 7 (1998) ("[Glirls-only math classes should not run afoul of the law as long as they are
optional and substantially equal to those offered to boys.").
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3. The Single-Sex Affirmative Action Program Must Not Include
Members of the Non-Disadvantaged Gender
Although members of the disadvantaged gender must be permitted
to participate in an equal co-educational alternative, members of the non-
disadvantaged gender are not allowed to participate in the single-sex
school, class, or activity. A single-sex educational program, established
for the objective of "overcom[ing] the effects of conditions which re-
sulted in [the] limited participation" of members of one gender, 224 is de-
signed solely for the gender that has limited opportunities. Accordingly,
it would make little sense to implement a program for the benefit of a
disadvantaged gender and simultaneously permit the non-disadvantaged
gender to participate in that identical school, class, or activity. Indeed,
permitting the non-disadvantaged gender to join the single-sex affirma-
tive action program would degrade, if not eliminate, the program's char-
acter as a method of overcoming the discriminatory conditions that have
limited the opportunities of one gender.
The Supreme Court in Hogan stated that an all-female nursing
school established for affirmative action purposes "fail[ed] the second
part of the equal protection test," namely the requirement that the single-
sex means be substantially related to the achievement of the compensa-
tory objective, because the recipient's "policy of permitting men to at-
tend classes as auditors fatally undermines its claim that women, at least
those in the School of Nursing, are adversely affected by the presence of
men. '225 In sum, a single-sex affirmative action program must contain
only students of the gender that has suffered a disadvantage related to
that program, and may not include, on a degree- or non-degree basis,
students of the non-disadvantaged gender.
4. Dual Single-Sex Affirmative Action Programs in the Same
Subject or Activity Are Impermissible
The Title IX regulations require the objectives of 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.34 to be implemented in an "evenhanded" manner.22 6 Regulation
34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(2) provides that "A recipient that provides a sin-
gle-sex class or extracurricular activity ... may be required to provide a
substantially equal single-sex class or extracurricular activity for students
of the excluded sex" in order to satisfy the evanhandedness requirement.
While 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(2) requires schools experimenting
with single-sex opportunities to provide a "substantially equal single-sex
class or extracurricular activity for students of the excluded sex," this is
224 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) (2007).
225 United States v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1981).
226 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(ii) (2007).
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not an appropriate requirement for single-sex programs established under
34 C.F.R. §106.3(b). A single-sex program is intended to compensate
for the effects of conditions that have limited the opportunities of mem-
bers of one gender.227 For example, a recipient may be interested in
establishing an all-female construction class in which women have been
steered away from vocational education programs. But, it is unlikely that
men have been directed away from vocational education programs on
account of their gender too. Thus, the factual predicate supporting the
need for an affirmative action construction program for men would not
exist. Since it is improbable for both genders to be discouraged from
pursuing the same educational opportunities on the basis of their gender,
it is virtually impossible for a recipient to offer programs to compensate
both genders for limited opportunities resulting from discriminatory con-
ditions in the same subject or activity. In short, only one gender is likely
to be disadvantaged with respect to a given subject or activity. Since
single-sex programs would only be permitted, under 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.3(b) for the disadvantaged gender and not the non-disadvantaged
gender, single-sex programs for both genders in the same subject or ac-
tivity would be impermissible. 228
This is not to say that dual single-sex schools, classes, or extracur-
ricular activities would not be permissible for other purposes. For exam-
ple, in Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a dual single-sex school system that
was established for a pedagogical purpose, namely "to furnish an educa-
tion of as high a quality as is feasible. '229 Single-sex schools for males
and females based on the "theory that adolescents may study more effec-
tively in single-sex schools," 230 however, is a different constitutional
ballgame from implementing single-sex schools for the purpose underly-
ing 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b). Accordingly, this discussion does not suggest
that dual single-sex programs based on the important governmental
objectives outlined in 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(i) cannot be offered.2 31
227 See id. § 106.3(b).
228 Please note that this discussion applies to dual single-sex programs in the same subject
or activity, such as medicine, mathematics, or auto repair. A different situation results when
different subjects or activities are contemplated. For example, a recipient may provide a sin-
gle-sex nursing school for men or a single-sex welding course for women, where men and
women were limited in their opportunities to pursue these respective subjects.
229 Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3rd Cir. 1976).
230 Id.
231 An interesting question, one to be explored more fully in another forum, is whether it
is permissible for a recipient to establish a dual single-sex program, in which one of the single-
sex school, class, or activity is implemented pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 106.34, while the other
single-sex school, class, or activity is implemented pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b)-e.g., if a
public school district created an all-male carpentry class in fight of evidence that academic
achievement for males in vocational education programs increases when the program is single-
sex, and the school district created an all-female carpentry class based on evidence of the
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5. The Single-Sex Affirmative Action Program Must Last No
Longer than the Discriminatory Conditions
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court held that "race-conscious ad-
missions policies must be limited in time. ' 232 Although Grutter was
concerned with race-based affirmative action, a durational requirement in
the gender-based affirmative action education context appears to be nec-
essary as well.
The purpose of a single-sex program established pursuant to 34
C.F.R. § 106.3(b) is to compensate for the limited opportunities of mem-
bers of a particular gender resulting from discriminatory conditions.
When the effects of the discriminatory conditions have dissipated, the
justification for the single-sex program under the Title IX regulation si-
multaneously disappears. In other words, a single-sex affirmative action
program that lasts longer than the effects of the discriminatory conditions
no longer enjoys the legal imprimatur of the Title IX regulation, at 34
C.F.R. § 106.3(b), and would be invalidated in a legal challenge. 233
Accordingly, a recipient implementing a single-sex program under
34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) should follow the instructions of the Grutter court,
which stated that "the durational requirement can be met by sunset provi-
sions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to de-
termine whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student
body diversity. '234 Note that the Title IX regulation, at 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.34(b)(4), similarly requires recipients to "conduct periodic evalua-
tions to ensure that single-sex classes or extracurricular activities are
based upon genuine justifications [J]" 235
In sum, even in the absence of a finding of discrimination on the
basis of sex, Title IX and 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) permit the establishment
effects of conditions resulting in the limited opportunities of females in vocational education.
This Article does not address whether such a dual-system would be unconstitutional. The only
suggestion made here is that a dual single-sex program in the same subject or activity-with
both classes established for affirmative action purposes-would not withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
232 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
233 See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Grutter, 539
U.S. at 342).
234 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
235 Though a geographical limitation on the discriminatory conditions that a recipient can
address is not specified in the regulations, it would seem reasonable to argue that the school
board may consider principally the conditions within its own jurisdiction, though regional or
national conditions may serve as secondary, though not exclusive, considerations in determin-
ing whether the factual predicate justifying affirmative action programs exists. Indeed, the
requirement of periodic review compels the recipient to evaluate the continuing need for the
single-sex program, which as a practical matter, given the limited administrative resources
available to a recipient, would entail a mainly local, not a broader or completely national,
inquiry.
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of a single-sex school, program, or activity, for affirmative action pur-
poses, if the following conditions are satisfied:
Each single-sex class or extracurricular activity is based
on the recipient's important objective of intentionally
and directly compensating members of the disadvan-
taged gender for the effects of conditions which resulted
in their limited participation in a manner related to the
limited participation;
The single-sex program does not perpetuate gender ste-
reotypes regarding the roles and abilities of men and/or
women;
An equal co-educational alternative, open to members of
both sexes, is offered in the same subject or activity;
Enrollment in the single-sex program is completely vol-
untary and is completely limited to members of the dis-
advantaged gender;
A single-sex school, class, or activity in the same subject
or activity is not offered, as affirmative action, for mem-
bers of the non-disadvantaged gender; and
The single-sex program is limited in duration and, more
specifically, lasts only as long as the effects of the dis-
criminatory conditions limiting the opportunities of the
members of a particular gender.
CONCLUSION
This discussion aimed to explore two particular questions: (1)
whether it is permissible, under Title IX, for a recipient of federal finan-
cial assistance to segregate students on the basis of gender for affirmative
action purposes, and (2) if so, what concrete factors can guide the educa-
tional and legal communities in ensuring that single-sex education pro-
grams are implemented in a manner consistent with applicable
constitutional and federal principles. It appears that single-sex education
as a means to overcome the conditions resulting in the limited participa-
tion of members of one gender is permissible both under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX and its
implementing regulations. Moreover, drawing on recent jurisprudential
and regulatory developments and on the helpful comments of various
legal scholars, this Article has also attempted to provide a list of six
factors that a recipient's single-sex educational affirmative action pro-
gram should comply with in order to withstand. a challenge in court.
2008]
620 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:579
Racial segregation of students is a deplorable practice that, thank-
fully, occupies a place in this nation's past and that no longer enjoys the
protection of our laws. The extent to which race should continue to be
involved in the educational context in other, less invidious forms, such as
preferences in admissions or assignment to schools, is an issue that right-
fully holds a prominent place in the American culture wars because of
Brown and the knowledge that the use of race in education has the power
to stigmatize, marginalize, and subjugate, even though such classifica-
tions may have the ability to dispel preconceived notions, improve inter-
racial collegiality, and move our nation's classrooms closer towards
resembling the American melting pot.
This duality, although most apparent in race-based classifications in
educational settings, exists in single-sex education as well. Accordingly,
as American society resumes its debate over the merits of race-based
classifications in education, the public may similarly desire to give due
consideration to the purported virtues of single-sex education, including
the promise of enhanced educational opportunities, and the potential for
such classifications to harm a particular gender, such as the perpetuation
of archaic stereotypes regarding the proper social roles of women.
Whether single-sex education, as a normative matter, is advanta-
geous for the American educational system, or whether the elected offi-
cials should amend the law to facially invalidate such programs, are areas
of concern that are properly reserved for the people and their representa-
tives. These questions must seek resolution in non-judicial processes and
venues.
While the debate goes on, and as recipients continue to experiment
with single-sex education programs, it is critically important for the
courts to ensure in the meantime that challenged single-sex affirmative
action programs are established in a manner consistent with law and that
the rights of students are protected to the fullest extent of the law. This
Article has hopefully assisted recipients, legal practitioners, and the
courts in understanding the present legal bounds within which this social
dialogue and educational experimentation may take place.
